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1 Introduction
The idea of taxing capital and labor income di¤erently has received substantially
attention over several years (Sødersen 2005a, 2005b; Lindhe-Södersten-Öberg,
2002, 2004). The theoretical foundations for such a proposition from the point
of view of optimal tax theory have been explored by Sødersen (2005b) in partic-
ular. One of them is the change of the world economy towards internationally
more mobile capital. The income of entrepreneurs represents partly return on
capital invested and partly compensation for their entrepreneurial e¤ort and
ability. Hence, entrepreneurial income is the natural subject of a mixed tax
treatment. In the development of such an approach, the Nordic countries were
pioneers. In the early 1990s Finland, Sweden and Norway replaced their global
income taxation, where all economic income is subject to a single progressive
tax schedule, by a version of dual income taxation. The personal income of
an entrepreneur was divided into capital income and earned income. Only the
latter is taxed at a progressive schedule while the former is taxed at a ‡at
rate. Hence, it was necessary to solve di¢cult problems of …nding an appropri-
ate splitting procedure. The solutions for this problem were not coordinated.
Instead, somewhat di¤erent experiments were undertaken.1
The Nordic reforms were designed to produce e¢ciency gains by reducing
the distortion caused by the non-uniform treatment of di¤erent kinds of income
from capital in the old system and to adopt, instead, a clear-cut dual income
tax (Nielsen and Sørensen 1997 and Sørensen 2005b). Also Tikka (1993) saw
the Nordic dual as a small country response to increasing international capital
mobility. Subsequently, Sørensen (1994) suggested that dual income tax may
1The Nordic dual with its split rules has attracted wide interest, re‡ected also in the recent
DICE Report of CESifo (DICE 2004). In the German popular debate, the dual tax has been
seen as a practical solution to tax competion from economies in transition. Indeed, the most
recent contribution appears to be the detailed proposal for a comprehensive tax reform by the
German Council of Economic Experts (2006). A proposal for a Swiss reform has been worked
by Keuschnigg and Dietz (2005).
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cause fewer distortions than the conventional income tax. Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) argued that the latter has a distortionary bias against investment in
non-human capital, which can be o¤set in the dual taxation. Sørensen (2005a,
2005b) elaborates a new split rule that delivers neutrality of investment and
…nancing decisions of entrepreneurs.
The major novelty of the Nordic dual appears in its acknowledgement that
the taxation of the entrepreneurial income should di¤erentiate the income from
capital and labor e¤ort. Split rules were introduced, de…ning the maximum that
is viewed as capital income for tax purposes. The practical solution revolved
around …nding a measure of assets invested (capital base) and an appropriate
rate of return on those assets (to be called a presumptive rate of return) .2
The approach has been found appropriate whether the unincorporated entre-
preneur operates as self-employed or an employer as a sole proprietor, is part
of a partnership or runs a closely-held corporation (CHC). The income of those
entrepreneurs is viewed as personal income and it is not subject to a separate
pro…ts tax.3 The splitting approach thus applies to the income (pro…t) of the un-
incorporated entrepreneurs. It also applies to the dividends from incorporated
closely-held companies4. Otherwise, the taxation principles of widely-held (e.g.
listed) companies apply to the CHS’s. The dividends and realized capital gains
from them are always treated as income from capital. Prior to the personal tax,
pro…ts from incorporated businesses are taxed at the corporation tax rate.
The idea of a dual income tax can be built into the tax system in various
2A separate proportional tax on all types of capital income has been another feature of the
solution. The bene…ts of the latter choice have been recognized in the Johansson-Samuelson
theorem, explicated by Sinn (1987), saying that a uniform tax on all capital income, net of
true economic depreciation, is neutral in respect of the choice of investment projects.
3Note that also the workers’ return on saving is taxed as capital income, not as earned
income. Uniformity requires the the same principle applies to enterpreneurs.
4The motive for the dividend split in the case of CHSs is di¤erent from that on unincorpo-
rated entrepreneurs, i.e. to prevent tax arbitrage. This is the Swedish and Finnish approach.
Up to 2005, Norway split the income of a CHC at the …rm level. In the most recent reform,
also Norway has moved to split the dividends.
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ways. In the recent Keuschnigg and Dietz (2005) tax proposal, the income tax
is dual in the sense that the taxation of capital income is based on a relatively
low tax rate while the taxation of earned income is progressive with the highest
marginal tax rates exceeding the proportional tax rate on capital income. This
is in line with the Nordic dual income tax. The entrepreneurs’ income, however,
is not split. The double tax on equity returns is mitigated by the introduction
of the ACE allowance. When it comes to tax the rent, the top marginal tax
rate on equity returns is aligned to the top marginal tax rate on earned income.
The purpose of the latter feature is to alleviate the income shifting incentive.
There are a few earlier studies on the behavior of enterprises under the
dual income tax. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) discussed at length the divi-
sion of income from small businesses. Kari (1999) argued that, depending on
how the ceiling of imputed capital income is determined, the Finnish dual in-
come tax may lead to a strong investment incentive for closely-held companies.
Lindhe et al. (2002, 2004) showed that the Swedish splitting scheme, based
on the acquisition value of company shares, is neutral in its treatment of in-
vestments by a closely-held company (CHC) …nanced by retained earnings in
respect of those by a widely-held one. The Norwegian scheme was found to be
distortive. Alstadsaeter (2003) considered the Norwegian case, suggesting that
it provides entrepreneurs with great incentives to participate in tax-minimizing
income shifting. She also concluded that the Norwegian dual income tax leads
to overinvestment and that the corporate organizational form serves as a tax
shelter for high-income entrepreneurs. Hagen and Sørensen (1998), Panteghini
(2001) and Sørensen (2005a) address the important issue of whether the pre-
sumptive rate of return should, in addition to a default-free rate of interest,
include a risk premium. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) report that the choice of the
type of payout from the CHCs to their owners is strongly, but not uniquely,
3
motivated by taxes.
Though several papers have discussed enterprise taxation, we undertake our
tax analysis in a di¤erent model. We develop a model of an entrepreneur whose
decisions include the entry at the start-up stage enterprise subject to an entry
cost (initial e¤ort needed), the failure risk, the expansion investment of the
surviving enterprises and the withdrawal of the founding entrepreneur at the
mature state, when he can give up his "baby". Most important, our framework
for an owner-managed enterprise is able to adopt the role of risk-taking of an
entrepreneur.5
We ask under what conditions the Nordic approach satis…es the neutrality
criterion in respect of the entrepreneurial choices. Is the Nordic approach a
reasonable strategy to tax entrepreneurs? This is our research question. More-
over, we ask what e¤ects it exerts on the start-up stage and expansion stage
cost of capital and whether it interferes the occupational choice of potential
entrepreneurs.
In our analysis, the wage rate and market interest rate are given. These
assumptions are consistent with the idea of enterprises being hosted by a small
open economy with the wage rate being determined by productivity in the trade-
ables sector and with the residence principle applied for the taxation of world-
wide interest income. The start-up is assumed to be domestically owned and
we focus on start-ups …nanced by the entrepreneur’s own funds. Therefore the
domestic taxes on dividends and capital gains remain relevant.
Our …ndings include some general results and some related to the Nordic dual
in particular. The neutrality results of dividend taxation from the tax theory of
mature companies do not carry over to start-ups. Theory of the cost of capital
for investments has centered on the issue of whether double taxation of dividends
5The insurance function of income taxation does not apply in the case of start-up enter-
prises. The government does not share losses from the start-up phase and no insurance is
available for the genuine business risk because of moral hazard.
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matters for marginal investments or whether it is that of retained earnings,
the dividend tax falling upon inframarginal investments.6 We show that it is
indispensable to di¤erentiate the early tax e¤ects on start-up enterprises from
the tax e¤ects on mature …rms. One lesson from our research is that double
taxation of dividends can raise the total tax rate on entrepreneurial income
above that on earned income, making dividend tax to act as an entry barrier.
Though rather evident, this proposition has not been stated clearly. Another
reason for a high start-up cost of capital is uncertainty which is shaded more or
less away in the case of mature companies. These results are not constrained to
the Nordic dual.
In our analysis of the Nordic dual some clear-cut rules are derived for tax
neutrality in the investment choice of the sole proprietors; in the case of in-
corporated enterprises, the conditions are harder to implement in practise. If a
non-neutral dual is chosen in practise, we show that heterogenous expectations
of pro…tability generate a distribution for the cost of capital among entrepre-
neurs because of a di¤erent marginal tax rate on highly pro…table enterprises
from less pro…table enterprises. For an incorporated enterprise, we …nd that the
entrepreneur’s ability threshold rises with the tax rate even when there is a tax
structure with uniform tax rates. In particular, Nordic dual encourages (dis-
courages) the establishment of a new enterprise by an entrepreneur who expects
high (low) pro…tability. The low types face a higher cost of capital for start-up
and expansion investments. For enterprises with high expected pro…tability, the
Nordic dual rules may give a boost to expansion investment and mitigate the
penalty on start-up investment caused by taxing dividends as earned income.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the components
of the model without taxation. Section 3 introduces the Nordic dual rules for
6The two views are summarized by Auerbach (1983). The "new view" was developed
independently by King (1974), Bergstöm and Södersten (1977), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford
(1981).
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the taxation of sole proprietors and section 4 for the taxation of incorporated
enterprises, investment incentives being analyzed in section 5. Section 6 studies
the career choice between an entrepreneur and a laborer. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model of an Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurial qualities Consider a single entrepreneur entering a partic-
ular industry, determined by his skill. Even though there can be di¤erences
in the prospects for returns in di¤erent industries, entrepreneurs are unable to
switch since their skills are industry-speci…c. The expectations of pro…tability
can also vary across entrepreneurs.
Potential entrepreneurs have a unique ability to produce project ideas. Some
are more productive and innovative than others. There is a continuum of them,
indexed by ability ? 2 (0? ?). There are three stages, indexed by time, ? = 0? 1? 2?
In stage ? = 0? individuals face a career choice between forming an enterprise and
entering the labor market? Commitment to entrepreneurship requires an initial
e¤ort, ? ? 0? and an initial investment, ? ? 0? at time ? = 0? E¤ort represents a
non-replicable input and the e¤ort cost is convex, ?(?) = 1
2
?2. Entrepreneurs do
not know ex ante the true pro…tability ? of their idea, only its distribution. The
…rst production stage provides entrepreneurs with a signal, ?? of the pro…tability.
Investment in a …rst-stage project thus provides a risky return
?(?? ?? ?) = ? + ??(?? ?; ?)?
Our notation here is non-standard but useful in showing that a successful entre-
preneur gets back his initial investment ? and an incremental return ??(?? ?; ??)?
The signal can take three values, ?? ? ?? ? ?? . With the probabilities ??? ?? ?
the project will be a success, the initial investment being recovered and an op-
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erating pro…t made with ??(?? ?; ??) ? ??(?? ?; ??) ? 0. We assume ? to be
jointly concave in ? and ?. Success occurs with the probability ?? + ?? ? 1.
Failure occurs with the probability 1 ¡ §??? when the project is of the type
? = ??? and returns nil. Enterprises with a bad signal ?? leave the market.
Those with a good signal have the option to allocate the …rst-stage cash ‡ow to
an immediate dividend, ?? or to expansion investment ? ? 0 at time ? = 1. If
only to clarify, the decisions on career choice, e¤ort (?), initial investment (?)
and …rst production are undertaken in period 0? After the signal has arrived,
the expansion investment ? and dividend (?) are decided in period 1?
To highlight the idea that risks are greatest at the early stage of a project,
we assume that the second-stage return is not subject to uncertainty. The
enterprise or its capital is assumed to be sold at its net asset value at time
? = 2?
To emphasize the fundamental di¤erences between start-up enterprises and
mature companies, we introduce di¤erent technologies in the two stages, ??(?? ?; ?)?
? (?; ?). The second-stage technology can be viewed as an advanced version of
the …rst-stage technology, formally expressed as ? (?? ?; ?) = ??(0? ?; ?)? It does
not require specialized inputs. Hence, no e¤ort is needed and the return is given
by ? (???; ?) which, given ?, is increasing and strictly concave in ? and ?? If
only to economize, we suppress ? and work with ? (?; ?).7 The second-stage
return is greater for an ?-…rm than for an ?-…rm, i.e. ? (?; ??) ? ? (?; ??).
We assume that the …rst-stage capital ? depreciates fully while the second-
stage capital does not. This distinction also highlights the heterogeneity of
capital over the life-cycle of the enterprise. In the second production stage the
7Note, however, that ? represents a unique ability, imbedded in the personality of the
entrepreneur, to create cash ‡ows. Intuitively, as the start-up technology is a prototype of
the mature company, the di¤erence arises from learning and business experience. To survive
successfully into an expansion stage, it is also necessary for the entrepreneur to develop a
proper organizational set-up for his business, a well functioning entrepreneurial or corporate
culture. In a merger, the acquiring …rm loses the unique ability of the entrepreneur unless his
ability is imbedded in the corporate culture.
7
successful enterprise accumulates net assets, ¢? = ? (?; ??) +??
The value of an entrepreneurial career Assume risk neutrality and let ?
denote the value of an entrepreneurial career in a risky industry. The cash ‡ows
in periods 1 and 2 are
? = ??(?? ?; ?) + ? ¡?; ? = ? (?; ?) +?? (1)
Let ? = the interest (discounting) rate. The second-stage cash ‡ow ? is condi-
tional on success in the initial stage, but deterministic for any successful project.
In terms of backward induction, the project value at the beginning of the second
stage is
?1(?; ?) = ¡? + ?
1 + ?
(2)
Then, the optimal risky career satis…es
? ¤0 (?? ?) = max
???
µ
¡ (?(?) + ?) + §??? 1
1 + ?
[??(?? ?; ?) + ? + ? ¤1 (?)]
¶
? (3)
where ? ¤1 (?) = max? ?1(?; ?)? provided that the participation constraint (7)
below is satis…ed. The …rst-order conditions for the maximization of (3) are
??(?; ??) = ?; ? = ??? (4)
§?????(?? ?; ??) =
µ
1
?
¶
(? + 1 ¡ §???) (5)
§?????(?? ?; ??) =
³ ?
?
´
[1 + ?] ? (6)
The cost of capital for expansion investment of surviving enterprises is given
by (4), the rate of interest. The enterprise of the more pro…table entrepreneur
has a greater growth, ?? ? ??. The …rst-stage cost of capital is (5) and
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accommodates the risk e¤ect. The probability of success §?? raises the expected
return (left-hand side) and the probability of failure 1¡§??? increases the cost of
capital (right-hand side). The latter is the skill-scaled asset cost, 1???multiplied
by the full opportunity cost of funds employed. High failure risk (1 ¡ §??)
thus raises the initial cost of capital, discouraging early investment. More able
entrepreneurs invest more initially. Note that when the two conditions (4) and
(5) hold with equality, they describe an interior solution for optimal dividend
along the growth path.8 Condition (6), with ?(?) = 12?
2? gives optimal e¤ort.
The left-hand side represents the marginal expected return on e¤ort. The right-
hand side is the forward value of the skill-scaled marginal cost of e¤ort. A high
…rst-stage cost of capital also reduces e¤ort.
The concept of the entry threshold in terms of the marginal entrepreneurial
?? ability completes our basic framework. At the outset, entrepreneurs do not
know the true type of their project, ?? only its distribution. They compare
various candidate projects using the discount rate, ?? to provide a ranking.
Those who enter as entrepreneurs evaluate the expected value of their career,
? , and compare it to the life-time value of an outside option, ?? labor income,
insured by social insurance. Then, the entry threshold is given by
? ¤0 (?) ¸ ?? (7)
Evaluating, ?? ¤0 (?)??? =
?
1+? ?(b??b?? ?) ? 0 holds because by the envelope the-
orem we need to consider only the direct e¤ect of a parameter change on the
optimized function (3). The project value is proportionately increasing in en-
trepreneurial ability. The most able agents become entrepreneurs, given that
the outside option is unrelated to the entrepreneurial skill. For the marginal
8We can also have a corner solution with all cash ‡ow invested and no dividends paid out
if the second-stage investment is expected to be highly pro…table with ?? ( b?) ? ?. Excluding
the possibility of a negative dividend (share issue), the cost of capital does not determine the
amount invested. In this paper, we do not analyze corner solutions in depth.
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entrepreneur with ability ??, ? ¤0 (?
?) = ? holds.
3 Tax E¤ects on Sole Proprietors and Partner-
ships
In the case of a sole proprietor or a partnership member, there is no dividend
income for tax purposes. Without a split approach, the business income of a
sole proprietor or a partnership member is taxed at the rate on earned income,
??? This is the tax rate determined by the realized total business income in the
respective income band ? on the progressive rate schedule, but we assume it to
take only two values ??? ? ?? ? ?
?
? where ?? is the tax rate on interest income.
For pro…table enterprises, it holds ?? ? ??? . However, we do not want to exclude
the possibility that for low-income entrepreneurs it may be that ??? ? ???
9
In the Nordic dual, the entrepreneur’s business income is split in order to tax
part of it as capital income. The basic principles of unincorporated enterprises
are the same in all Nordic countries. Our question is when a split approach is
neutral with respect to the early-stage and later-stage cost of capital. Then,
we ask whether the Nordic system deviates from the neutrality benchmark. In
the case of a sole proprietor or a partnership, retained pro…t once taxed is not
subject of another tax at exit when the business is sold out at its net asset value
in the …nal stage.
Consider …rst taxation without the split. Denoting the tax rate on interest
income by ??? the net rate of interest is given by ? = (1 ¡ ??)e?? with e? denoting
the gross interest rate. Under success, the tax liability is thus
? (?? ???; ?? ?) = ?1 + ?2 = ??
??(?? ?; ?)
1 + ?
+ ? ??
? (?; ?)
(1 + ?)2
? (8)
9Actually, this holds in the Finnish case.
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The sole proprietor maximizes
? ? (?) = max
?????
[??(?? ???;?? ?) ¡ §???? (?? ???;?? ?)] (9)
where ?? (¢) is given by (3). The …rst-order conditions of this optimization
problem are
??(?; ??) =
?
1 ¡ ? ??
; ? = ??? (10)
§???(1 ¡ ? ??)??(?? ?; ??) =
µ
1
?
¶
(? + 1 ¡ §???) (11)
§??
?(1 ¡ ? ??)??(?? ?; ??) =
³ ?
?
´
[1 + ?] ? (12)
We notice that these conditions are also the benchmark values of a Johansson-
Samuelson (JS) tax, taxing all income comprehensively once, including interest
income, i.e. ?? = ??.10 Thus while the cost of capital for expansion investment
is the gross rate of interest e?? the JS tax clearly is not neutral in respect of the
…rst-stage investment subject to a prospective capital loss of
¡
1 ¡ §??¢ because
such a loss is not deductible from taxable income. In contrast to the Domar-
Musgrave (1944) case and for a given ??, the tax-adjusted return which the
entrepreneur must earn is 1?(1 ¡ ??) ? 1 times the expected unrecoverable
initial stake.
Expansion Investment: When Does the Split Lead to Neutrality? The
Nordic dual splits the entrepreneur’s total business income into income from
capital and earned income using the concept of a capital base.11 This consists
10The so called Johansson-Samuelson tax, as phrased by Sinn (1987), refers to a uniform
tax on all capital income with economi depreciation.
11There are di¤erences in many details in the dual income systems of the three Nordic
countries which have adopted it. In the taxation of unincorporated business, the various
Nordic approaches are quite similar. In the case of corporations, Sweden and Finland split
the dividend while Norway used to split the pre-tax pro…t (before its most recent reform).
Moreover, Finland de…nes the capital base as including the …nancial assets while Norway does
not. In addition, Sweden does not make the expansion investment qualify for the capital base
while Finland does. For discussion of some of these details, we refer to our CESifo discussion
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of the entrepreneur’s initial investment and the reinvested business income, to
be denoted by ?1 and ?2 in the two stages. The tax authorities impute the
amount of capital income by a presumptive rate of return, say ?, and taxes ??1
and ??2 at the ‡at rate, ??. Any remaining business pro…ts are taxed at the
rate of earned income, ? ??.
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The after-tax value of the entrepreneurial career in the second stage is then
? ¤1 (?
?) = ¡? + ? (?) +? ¡
£
????2 + ? ??(? (?) ¡ ??2)
¤
1 + ?
? (13)
Solving for the optimal expansion investment ??
?? =
µ
1 ¡ ??
1 ¡ ? ??
¶ e? ¡ µ? ?? ¡ ??
1 ¡ ? ??
¶
??
0
2(?)? (14)
Require now in the tax system with ? ?? di¤erent from ?? that the pre-tax cost
of capital equals that in the tax-free economy, the gross interest rate ?? = e??13
we obtain for the neutrality condition,
??
0
2(?) = e?? (15)
We thus have proved
Proposition 1 For tax neutrality in respect to growth of the enterprises of self-
employed and partnerships enterprises, the marginal tax shield produced by the
split system should satisfy ??
0
2(?) = e??
The legislator has therefore alternatives. It can introduce either a high
presumptive rate ? and low marginal base ?
0
2(?) or the other way round. The
paper version, Kanniainen, Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005).
12Some authors prefer the terms normal dividend and excess dividends. . . . “ Jouko kir-
joittaa lyhyen alaviitan.
13Note that the gross interest rate e? is the same in the tax-free and in the taxed economy
as we have assumed the case of a small open economy.
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Nordic dual can be interpreted to be based on the idea that ?2 = ?? Hence
?
0
2(?) = 1? Neutrality of the Nordic dual thus requires that ? = e?? i.e. that the
presumptive rate equals the gross interest rate.
Investment Incentive in the Growth Stage If the legislator has ended up
in a non-neutral taxation of entrepreneurs, we report a powerful result.
Proposition 2 For those entrepreneurs whose realized pro…t was low ?? ? ??
with ??? ? ??, the split system represents a penalty on expansion investment.
For those enterprises which turned out to be highly pro…table, the split system
provides a strong investment incentive in the expansion stage.
Proof. The conclusion can be obtained from the sign of the latter term
including
³
??¡??
1¡??
´
in the above …rst-order condition (14).
Uncertainty about ? is revealed before the expansion investment so that the
tax relief is available for those entrepreneurs who expect their total business
income to settle in the income band where they face a tax rate ??? ? ??. But,
if the business generates relatively little total income so that ??? ? ?? holds
in that income band, the Nordic split rule alters into an additional tax on the
entrepreneur’s expansion-stage capital, leading to a higher cost of capital than
without the dual.14
In deriving the above result, we have considered the tax rate structure as
given. When a split system is introduced in an equilibrium where investment
behavior is distorted by the existing tax system, the Nordic dual appears to
provide a second-best improvement. Entrepreneurs with pro…table ideas …nd
that the tax on retained pro…t is reduced, making an expansion investment
worthwhile at the margin.
14This is the reason why the current system of Finland allows an unincorporated entrepre-
neur to elect the presumptive rate ? to be set at either 20 per cent or 10 per cent.
13
Initial Investment The expected …rst-stage tax liability is
?1 = ????1 + §???? ??(??(?? ?? ?) ¡ ??1)?
Inserting this into the value function, the …rst-order condition in respect of the
initial investment is
§???[(1 ¡ ? ??)?? 0?(?? ?; ?)] = e?(1 ¡ ??) + 1 ¡ §??? ¡ §???(? ?? ¡ ??)??01(?))? (16)
We contrast this to the comparable condition in a tax-free economy
§????? 0?(?? ?; ?) = e? + 1 ¡ §????
Solving for ??01(?) which maintains the investment equal to that in a tax-free
economy,
??01(?) =
§???? ????
0
?(?? ?; ?
?) ¡ e???
§??? (? ?? ¡ ??)
?
To satisfy neutrality in the case of uncertainty about the success and the indus-
try prospects, the marginal capital base ??01(?) ought to be industry- or even
enterprise speci…c as it depends on pro…t expectations and their probabilities.
Moreover, it depends on the existing tax rates, ? ??? ??? Such a challenging out-
come may be a relevant requirement in the real world but it is an unrealistic
one. However, it is useful to consider the neutrality when only the risk of failure
is involved.
Failure Risk and the Neutrality Condition Let us thus give up for a
moment the distinction between high-pro…table and low-pro…table enterprises.
Assume that all entrepreneurs face the risk of failure (1 ¡ ?) but in case of
success (with probability ?) have the same pro…tability. The above condition
14
simpli…es to
??01(?) =
????? 0?(?? ?; ?) ¡ e???
?(?? ¡ ??) ?
In a tax-free economy, ??? 0?(?? ?; ?) = e? + 1 ¡ ?? Inserting, we obtain the neu-
trality condition
Proposition 3 In the presence of a failure risk, the neutrality condition for the
Nordic dual with respect to the early investment is
??01(?) =
e?
?
+
µ
??
?? ¡ ??
¶
1 ¡ ?
?
? (17)
This gives the split rule which yields the same …rst-period investment. We
can interpret the Nordic approach such that the early stage capital base equals
the capital invested, ?1(?) = ?? Then, the presumptive rate ? should not only
be related to the risk-adjusted interest rate e?? but also to the tax structure. This
creates some tedious practical problems. In practice, the Nordic countries have
chosen to adjust the presumptive rate ? for, say an average (economy-wide) risk
premium. This is "on average" a good way to go though inter-…rm di¤erences
in risks somewhat distort the outcome.
Considering our Propositions 1 and 3 together, the government faces a trade-
o¤. If the presumptive tax rate is chosen to satisfy the neutrality of investment
in the expansion stage, ? = e?? this may clearly discourage the early (riskier)
investment. On the other, if the risk adjustment is carried out to achieve neu-
trality in the early investment, mature …rms may overinvest.15
Actual Investment Incentives How does the actual non-neutral split rule
a¤ect the behavioral incentives? We obtain
Proposition 4 For those entrepreneurs who expect to face a tax rate ??? ? ??,
15We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this implication.
15
the split system represents a penalty on start-up investment and e¤ort, magni-
fying the risk of failure e¤ect. However, for those enterprises which expect to
face a tax rate ??? ? ??, the split system provides a strong investment incentive
in the early stage.
Proof. The result derived from the …rst-order condition (16) above.
In their in‡uential proposition, De Meza and Webb (1999) have suggested
that a tax on new enterprises results in a welfare gain. This policy proposition is
derived in a model where …rms resort to outside …nancing in conditions of asym-
metric information. Our result concerning the tax penalty in a non-neutral dual
system on new enterprises with low expected pro…tability appears to represents
a tax on enterprises with a positive but low values, see also our last chapter.
4 Dual Taxation of Closely-Held Incorporated
Enterprises
In the case of sole proprietors and partnerships, the Nordic countries have
adopted an approach where it is the business income which is subject to the
split while in the case of closely held corporation, it is the dividend. This holds
also for Norway after the most recent tax reform.
Our modelling can be interpreted to capture both the classical and the impu-
tations systems, regarding an incorporated company and its owners as separate
tax entities. One can think that the imputation systems are re‡ected in the
magnitude of our tax rates ?? and ??. Such an interpretation simpli…es the
notation.
Let ??? ??? ?? denote the tax rates on pro…ts, dividends and earned income.
Write …rst the expression for the present value of the integrated tax liability of
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a successful CHC without the split rule
? (?? ???? ?) = ??
??(?? ?? ?)
1 + ?
+ ??
(1 ¡ ??)??(?? ?? ?) + ? ¡?
1 + ?
(18)
+ ??
? (?? ?)
(1 + ?)2
+ ??
[? (?? ?)(1 ¡ ??) +?] ¡ ?
(1 + ?)2
?
The operating pro…ts ??(?? ?? ?) and ? (???) form the corporation tax base.
The entrepreneur’s dividend tax base is ? = (1 ¡ ??)??(?? ?? ?) + ? ¡? at time
? = 1. The assets of an enterprise are sold at their net asset value at time ? = 2
and the returns are paid out as dividends.
Growth Stage: Tax Neutrality Consider then the split rule applied to div-
idends. The taxman imputes the income from capital at a presumptive rate of
return, ?, taxes ??1, at the rate ?? on dividends while the remaining distributed
pro…t, ? ¡ ??1? is taxed at the rate on earned income, ? ??? Then the personal
dividend taxes paid by the entrepreneur at time ? = 1 and ? = 2 are
? ?1 = ????1 + ?
?
? [(1 ¡ ??)??(?? ?? ?) + ? ¡? ¡ ??1] (19)
? ?2 = ????2 + ?
?
? [(1 ¡ ??)? (?) +? ¡ ? ¡ ??2] (20)
making the present value of the integrated tax liability
? (?? ???? ?) = ??
??(?? ?? ?)
1 + ?
+
µ
??
??1
1 + ?
+ ? ??
[(1 ¡ ??)??(?? ?? ?) + ? ¡? ¡ ??1]
1 + ?
¶
(21)
+ ??
? (?? ?)
(1 + ?)2
+
µ
??
??2
(1 + ?)2
+ ? ??
[(1 ¡ ??)? (?) +? ¡ ? ¡ ??2]
(1 + ?)2
¶
?
It is assumed that the taxman allows ? to be deductible in the second pe-
riod.16 Inserting the tax liability in the valuation expression, we can analyze
16This is one of the many features which makes the enterprise taxation di¤er from a taxation
of a widely-held corporation which continues its life regardess of changes in ownership. This
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the issue of tax neutrality.
Using the value function in the second stage is, the …rst-order condition in
respect of ? is
?? = e? ¡ ¡? ?? ¡ ??¢ ??02
(1 ¡ ??)(1 ¡ ? ??)
?
It appears that for investment neutrality in the expansion stage, the Nordic
dual should make ?2 unrelated to the capital ?? making ??02 = 0? This gives
?? = e? which is the conditions in a tax-free economy. Interesting enough,
Sweden has adopted a system where ?2 = ?2(?) with no adjustment for the
expansion investment?. Moreover, though Sweden has maintained the classical
double taxation, no investment distortion need to arise in the expansion stage.
This follows from two e¤ects, the Johansson-Samuelson tax (?? = ??) and the
capitalization of the dividend tax.17 We notice that Lindhe, Södersten and
Öberg (2004) were able to obtain organizational neutrality between the behavior
of a CHC and a WHC, but the investment neutrality was not possible to obtain.
In the case of the Finnish capital base with ? = ?? enterprise taxation
appears to have clear-cut e¤ects on the expansion stage, discriminating between
high-and low-pro…table companies due to their the tax rate di¤erential ? ??¡?? :
Proposition 5 The Nordic dual, encourages the enterprise growth for those
enterprises which turned out to pass the initial stage with a high pro…tability.
The Nordic dual punishes the expansion of those enterprises which turned out
to be less pro…table.
CHC: Initial Investment We focus on the case where the entrepreneur
knows that the tax authority allows him to deduct the …rst-stage investment
cost from the tax base in the second period, as it cannot represent income.
has bearing on the …rst-stage results.
17We …nd out in the next section, however, that the double taxation is not neutral with
respect to market entry.
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Solving again for the …rst-order condition
§???(1¡??)
¡
1 ¡ ? ??
¢
?? 0(?) = e?(1¡??)+1¡§???¡§??? ¡? ?? ¡ ??¢ ??01¡?§???? ??1 + ? ?
Again in a tax-free economy, §????? 0?(?? ?; ?
?) = e? + 1 ¡ §???? Solving, for the
neutrality condition
??01 =
§???
£
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ??)
¡
1 ¡ ? ??
¢¤
?? 0?(?? ?; ?
?) ¡ e??? + ?§???? ??1+?
§??? (? ?? ¡ ??)
?
Our earlier impression repeats itself here: it is hard to obtain neutrality
within the Nordic dual taxation in the initial stage. We notice that in the case
of closely-held companies, it is not possible to have a simple neutrality condition
because the tax rates ?? vary across individuals. Though this conclusion is
somewhat pessimistic for those aiming at tax neutrality, we can see from the
…rst-order condition that the actual Nordic dual has predictable implications
for the investment behavior of the CHC’s.
Proposition 6 The Nordic split rule encourages the start-up investment of en-
trepreneurs expecting to be pro…table facing a tax rate ??? ? ?? and discourages
the investment of entrepreneurs expecting to run less pro…table enterprises, fac-
ing the tax rate ??? ? ???
E¤ects of Uncertainty We are, however, able to qualify the neutrality result
when working with the success/failure but abstracting from the di¤erences in
the expected pro…tability. In the presence of the failure risk, the neutrality
condition for the Nordic dual with respect to the early investment k in CHC’s
simpli…es to
??01 = e? (1 ¡ ??) ¡ (1 ¡ ??) (1 ¡ ??)? (?? ¡ ??) + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ ??) (1 ¡ ??)] (1 ¡ ?) +
?§???? ??
1+?
? (?? ¡ ??) ?
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Regardless of the complications, the risk of failure has a predictable e¤ect:
for neutrality, the failure risk enhances the required marginal capital base. One
can somewhat simplify this result in the case where the elimination of the double
taxation is feasible. Then, ??(1 ¡ ??) = 0 and the conditions reads
??01(?) =
e?
?
+
??
(?? ¡ ??)
µ
(1 ¡ ?)
?
+
e?(1 ¡ ??)
?(1 + e?(1 ¡ ??))
¶
?
5 Career Choice: Entrepreneur or Laborer?
It is a property of the Johansson-Samuelson tax with full loss o¤sets that the
tax structure is neutral in respect of the career choice between the outside
option and operating as a sole proprietor (i.e. an unincorporated enterprise).
There is no tax issue involved. Yet most of the small enterprises operate in an
incorporated form. We show that the reasons must be other than taxation, like
access to limited liability and other net bene…ts. We argue that taxation need
not be neutral in respect of the formation of incorporated companies, as CHC’s.
We examine the entry threshold for the CHC’s in general and, thereafter, within
the Nordic dual.
When incorporated, the entrepreneur maximizes
? ? = max
?????
[??(?
? ? ?? ? ?? ) ¡
X
?
??? (?? ? ?? ??? )]?
where the notation with the super index ? denotes the variables under taxation.
Consider …rst the entrepreneurial choices under a uniform structure of tax rates,
?? = ?? = ?? = ??? We can invoke the neutrality properties of the Johansson-
Samuelson tax. Yet, the occupational choice may de distorted even with the
Johansson-Samuelson tax. The reason is simple enough: in the classical tax
system with no imputation, the after-tax enterprise value is lower than the
20
present value of the after-tax outside option with identical cash ‡ows. Though
this mechanism is implicitly discussed in the tax literature (Harberger (1962)),
the earlier work on enterprise taxation has largely abstracted from the question
of occupational choice. We can show formally the following18 . Let ?? denote
the marginal talent of an incorporated entrepreneur under taxation. Consider
the case of income taxation with full loss o¤sets and double taxation on income
from corporation. Then it follows that under a tax structure with uniform tax
rates, i.e. ? = ?? = ?? = ?? = ??? there is a positive relationship between the
tax rate and the marginal entrepreneurial talent, ?????? ? 0? This result holds
strictly for a tax structure which is neutral in the traditional sense that it does
not distort the e¤ort choice ?? and investments ?? ? ?? ? However, we expect it
to hold more generally. We therefore prove
Proposition 7 Let ?? and ?? denote the marginal entrepreneurial talents in
the absence of taxation and under taxation, respectively. Then it follows that
under a tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e. ? = ?? = ?? = ?? = ??, there
is a linear dependence between the marginal entrepreneurial talents
?? = ?? + ?1??? (22)
where ?1 is a strictly positive constant and greater than one.
Proof. Available in the Technical Appendix.
The proposition suggests that even a uniform tax structure ?? = ?? = ?? =
?? is distortive in respect of enterprise formation. With identical cash ‡ows,
the after-tax enterprise value would be lower in the classical tax system than
the present value of the after-tax outside option. The dividend tax, unless
an imputation is introduced, is distortionary and a¤ects the career choice of
18The proof is available in the Technical Appendix.
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individuals. For the equality ? ?? (?
?) = ?(1 ¡ ??) to hold, ?? must be greater
with a uniform tax structure than in the absence of taxation, i.e. the new
business idea must show greater pro…tability. With a non-uniform tax structure,
an additional distortion may be created by the undervaluation at exit. Dividend
taxation may thus have larger distortions on enterprise formation than has been
previously recognized by the literature emphasizing its capitalization.
We next examine the e¤ects of Nordic dual on entrepreneurship. Take the
Finnish case for the tax-adjusted value of the enterprise. We prove the following
proposition, which also holds for the Swedish and Norwegian model.
Proposition 8 The Nordic dual model encourages the establishment of new
enterprises by optimistic entrepreneurs who expect with certainty (?? = 1) to be
of the high-pro…tability type. It discourages the establishment of new enterprises
by entrepreneurs who expect with certainty (?? = 1) to be of the low-pro…tability
type.
Proof. Plug (17) into (16) and that into (9) to obtain ? ?? (?? )? the tax-
adjusted value of an enterprise?Introduce it into the indi¤erence condition, ? =
? ?? (?
?) ¡?(1 ¡ ??) = 0? totally di¤erentiate it, arriving at
???
??
= ¡ ?????
??????
?
where
????? =
1
1 + ?
(? ?? ¡ ??)[?1 +
?2
1 + ?
]
?????? =
1
1 + ?
(1 ¡ ? ??)(1 ¡ ??)?(?? ?; ??) ? 0?
? = ???? Therefore, ?????? ? 0? when (? ?? ¡ ??) ? 0 and ?????? ? 0? when
(? ?? ¡ ??) ? 0?
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Recently, Coelho, De Meza and Reyniers (2004) have suggested that entre-
preneurs are typically overly optimistic. If correct, this proposal has implications
when reading our results. The above proposition is informative on the e¤ects
of changing presumptive rate but given the degree of optimism or pessimism
of the entrepreneur. The neutrality condition with respect to the Nordic dual
requires
³
???
??
´
= ¡ ??????????? = 0? However, this is not satis…ed apart from the
case ? ??¡?? when the Nordic dual is not needed. When high pro…tability enter-
prises are concerned with ? ?? ¡ ?? ? 0? the Nordic dual encourages their entry
as an increase in the presumptive rate ? reduces both the marginal and the av-
erage tax rate of high-pro…tability enterprises, creating the incentive suggested
by our proposition. When ? ?? ¡ ?? ? 0? enterprise formation is discouraged.
To clarify the mechanism, we notice that with given tax rates, ??? ? ?
?
? ? ??? an
increase in the presumptive rate ? reduces both the marginal and the average
tax rate of high-pro…tability enterprises, creating the incentive suggested by our
proposition.
6 Concluding Discussion
In dual income taxation a split rule is needed for closely-held companies and sole
proprietors to divide business income into income from capital and labor income.
Its purpose is twofold i.e. avoiding overtaxing the return on capital in unincor-
porated enterprises and to prevent the entrepreneurs organized as CHS’s from
shifting their labor income to the sphere of income from capital. This paper has
studied the incentives created by such a split. We have emphasized the need to
incorporate the neglected observation, the di¤erential treatment of low and high
pro…tability enterprises into the theory of enterprise taxation. The rules may in
fact raise the tax burden of low-pro…tability small enterprises. These entrepre-
neurs face a higher cost of capital for start-up and expansion investments and
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a higher tax cost on e¤ort provision than without the dual rules. The opposite
incentives are o¤ered to high-pro…tability enterprises. Their distributed pro…ts
would be taxed residually as earned income at a higher rate than the tax rate
on capital income. By refraining from distributing such residual dividends and
instead by investing and expanding their asset base, the basis of imputed future
capital income, the entrepreneurs can smooth their tax payments.19
In our paper, we abstract from the outside …nancing for several reasons. In-
troducing outside …nance would raise pertinent issue arising from informational
asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the …nanciers. We point to Fuest,
Huber and Nielssen (2002) paper for discussion of those issues in the case of
debt …nance and to Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) in the case of venture capi-
tal …nance. The earlier results by Kari (1999) and Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg
(2004) point to the view that the introduction of debt …nancing does not raise
behavioral incentives which would be particularly relevant for the dual tax.
As regards a comprehensive income tax with full o¤setting of losses, which
is neutral in respect of the career choice between an entrepreneur or a laborer,
we show that a tax rate increase in a system with a uniform rate structure
over all kinds of income can increase the ability threshold of individuals who
choose entrepreneurship. With such a rate structure, the e¤ects of the dual rules
themselves vanish by de…nition. A general tax rate cut within uniform tax rates
thus induces a larger proportion of individuals to choose entrepreneurship. But,
with non-uniform personal tax rates, the Nordic dual, with its embedded split
rule, tends to lower (raise) the ability threshold of entrepreneurs who expect
high (low) pro…tability from their enterprises. Therefore, we conclude that the
Nordic dual enhances entrepreneurship where high pro…tability is expected.
19The dual rules prevent the entrepreneur from avoiding the high marginal tax rate on
earned income at exit by either double-taxing undistributed pro…ts (Finland), taxing only
windfall capital gains (Norway) or by applying the split rule to realized capital gains (Sweden).
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7 Technical Appendix to "Nordic Dual Income
Taxation of Entrepreneurs"
7.1 Proof of the Career Choice
Plug the expression of tax liability (18) into the maximand (9) to derive the
tax-adjusted value of the enterprise. We then prove the result that under a
tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e. ? = ?? = ?? = ?? = ??? there is
a positive relationship between the tax rate and the marginal entrepreneurial
talent, ?????? ? 0? where the tax structure is constructed to be neutral in
respect of e¤ort choice ?? and investments ?? ? ?? ? We assume that there is
perfect loss-o¤set even for a start-up …rm. Disallowing for perfect loss-o¤set
would make our result hold for a further reason.
Consider thus the indi¤erence (identity) condition for occupational choice
under taxation, i.e. an entrepreneur versus a laborer,
? ?? (?
? ) = ?(1 ¡ ??)? (23)
or
¡ (?(??) + ?? ) + ? 1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??) [???(?? ? ?? ) + ?? + ? ¤?1 (?)]
¡ ?
·
??
???(?? ? ?? )
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??) + ?? (1 ¡ ??)???(?? ? ??) + ?? ¡??1 + b?(1 ¡ ??)
¸
¡ ?
·
??
? (??)
(1 + b?(1 ¡ ??))2 + ?? (? (??)(1 ¡ ??) +?? ) ¡ ??(1 + b?(1 ¡ ??))2
¸
¡ ?(??)(1 ¡ ??) = 0?
Derive then the impact of an increase in the tax rate on the ability of the mar-
ginal entrepreneur. There will be three mechanisms to be considered. First, a
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marginal increase in tax rates reduces the after-tax cash ‡ows to the enterprise
in both production periods. This tends to raise the entrepreneurial threshold.
However, there is an o¤setting e¤ect to the extent that the discount rate de-
creases. This e¤ect will tend to push up the discounted value of the after-tax
cash ‡ows, though they are reduced in size. Third, an increased tax on interest
income raises the present value of wage income in labor contracts. This is also
bad news for entrepreneurship because it tends to push up the entrepreneurial
threshold as labor market prospects are more attractive than they used to be.
The present value of labor income, written explicitly, is
?(??) = ??[
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??) +
µ
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??)
¶2
]
and we recall,
? ¤?1 (?) = ¡? +
? (?? ) +??
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??) ?
Inserting, we obtain
¡ (?(?? ) + ?? )+
?
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??) [(1 ¡ ??)(1 ¡ ??)??(?? ? ??) ¡ (1 ¡ ??)?? + (1 ¡ ??)?? ]+
?(
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ??))2[(1 ¡ ??)(1 ¡ ??)? (?? ) + (1 ¡ ??)?? + ???? ]
= (1 ¡ ??)?(??)?
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to ? and ?? ? the entrepreneurial threshold
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is determined as
???
??
=
1
(1 ¡ ?)(2 + ?)?(?? ? ?? ) [
2? (?? ) + ??(?? ? ?? )(?2 + 4? + 2)
1 + ?
+
2(?(??) + ?? ))
?(1 ¡ ?)2 ¡
2(1 ¡ ?)??? + 2(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ?)?)??
(1 ¡ ?)2(1 + ?)? ]?
The entrepreneurial threshold is distorted by taxation even at uniform rates,
basically because entrepreneurial income is subject to double taxation in an
incorporated enterprise. This is the e¤ect hinted at by King (1989). The ability
threshold of the marginal entrepreneur is increased if ??
?
?? ? 0? The expression
for ??
?
?? can be grouped into two positive terms and one negative term. Recall
that the opportunity cost ? can be thought of as a compound return over a
number of years and the operating cash ‡ows are similarly accumulated returns
over each stage. Therefore, the positive terms outweigh the negative term.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 7.
In the absence of taxation, the marginal entrepreneur ?? is identi…ed from the
condition ¡ (?(?) + ?) + ? 1
1+? [?
??(?? ?) + ? + ? ¤1 (?)] = ?? Inserting into the
indi¤erence condition under taxation? and recalling that ? ¤1 (?) = ¡?+ ? (?)+?1+?(1¡?) ?
we …nd that there is a linear dependence between the marginal abilities
?? = ?? + ?1???
Its parameters are given by
?1 =
(1 ¡ ??)
(1 ¡ ??)(1 ¡ ??)
?(?? ?)
?(?? ? ?? )
?
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and by
?? =
1
(1 ¡ ??)(1 ¡ ??) [
1
?
1+b?(1¡?)?(?? ? ?? )? +
?(?) ¡?
1 ¡ ?? ]
where
? = (?(??) + ?? ) ¡ (1 ¡ ??)(?(?) + ?)
+ ?
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ?) [(1 ¡ ??)? ¤1 (?) ¡ ? ¤?1 (?)]
+ ?
1
1 + b?(1 ¡ ?) [(1 ¡ ??)(? ¡ (1 + ??)?? )]
+ ?[??
¡??
1 + b?(1 ¡ ?) + ?? ? (?? )(1 + b?(1 ¡ ?))2
+ ??
(? (?? )(1 ¡ ??) +??)
(1 + b?(1 ¡ ?))2 ]
We know that under distortive taxes, ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? and that ?? ? ?? Thus,
?(???)
?(?? ??? ) ? 1? With a uniform tax rate,
(1¡??)
(1¡??)(1¡??) ? 1? Therefore, ?1 ?? 1?
Moreover, the greater the dividend and the corporate tax rates are, the greater
the coe¢cient ?1 is? This tends to make ?? ? ???We notice that there are both
positive and negative terms in ?? Yet, the term ?(?)¡?1¡?? de…nitively is positive.
Though we cannot determine the sign of ? for sure, the facts are that ?1 ?? 1
and that ?(?)¡?
1¡?? ? 0? This allow us to suggest that the dependence between ?
?
and ?? is positive; as a matter of fact, ?? ¸ 0 is not even needed for ?? ? ???
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